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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
PROFESSOR GRIFFITH: Hello. Welcome to Fordham Law 
School. My name is Sean Griffith. I’m the T.J. Maloney Chair in 
Business Law and Professor of Law here at Fordham. I also have the 
pleasure of directing the Fordham Corporate Law Center. It’s my honor 
to welcome SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher here tonight to 
address the “The Securities and Exchange Commission: The Next 80 
Years.” The Sommer Lecture gives us the opportunity to have 
Commissioner Gallagher come to Fordham Law School. This lecture 
series is now celebrating its fifteenth year here at Fordham Law School 
and is co-sponsored by the law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. 
We’re very grateful for that sponsorship. The lecture honors the legacy 
of former SEC Commissioner and securities law practitioner, Al 
Sommer, who was a leader on the Commission, an outstanding lawyer, 
and a mentor to many scholars and practitioners in the field of securities 
law. I want to recognize the driving force behind the creation of this 
lecture, John Peloso, Fordham Law School class of 1960, and senior 
counsel now at Morgan Lewis. Thank you, John. 
Before I turn the podium over to Ben Indek, I want to thank all of 
our board members, our friends, our alums, and our students for joining 
us tonight. Members of the Sommer family are with us tonight and we 
thank them for continuing the great legacy of this lecture. Now, let me 
turn the podium over to Ben Indek, partner at Morgan Lewis, who will 
introduce our speaker. 
 
BEN A. INDEK: Good evening everybody. On behalf of Morgan 
Lewis, I welcome you to the fifteenth annual A.A. Sommer Lecture. 
More than thirty years ago, Al Sommer started Morgan Lewis’ securities 
law practice. So, as a way to honor that contribution to the firm, we 
created this lecture series in his name. Al was a Morgan Lewis partner 
from 1979 until 1994. He then became counsel to the firm. He was a 
great public servant having been an SEC Commissioner, Chairman of 
the Public Oversight Board, and a public member of the AICPA. In the 
private sector, Al was a trusted advisor to CEOs and boards, a prolific 
author, and an expert on a broad range of securities law topics. Al 
participated in the first two lectures we held at Fordham Law School. 
Some of you will remember him taking the microphone and pressing the 
lecturer on parts of their remarks. 
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Unfortunately, Al passed away in 2002. Nevertheless, we are 
delighted that his family continues its close relationship with Morgan 
Lewis and Fordham Law. As evidence of that, over the years, several 
generations of the Sommer family have attended this event. We are 
delighted that they are here this evening: Starr, Ed, Nancy, and Becky. 
We’re also pleased by the continued support of the SEC Historical 
Society and its Executive Director, Carla Rosati, for their contribution to 
this lecture series. Al understood the important mission of the Society 
and provided it both with his memories of his time at the Commission 
and some of his papers, in an effort to help make the organization the 
vital historical resource that it is today. 
They may be separated by forty years at the SEC, but Al and our 
speaker tonight, Commissioner Daniel Gallagher, have several things in 
common. A dedication to public service—check. An appreciation for the 
balance between regulation and capital formation—yes. Success in 
private practice—check. A willingness to engage in passionate, but 
respectful, debate about the role of the SEC—yes. 
One other little known fact about our lecturer this evening. As 
noted, this is our fifteenth year here at Fordham. During that time, we’ve 
had a distinguished roster of speakers. We’ve had SEC Chairs and 
Commissioners, heads of enforcement at the SEC and the UK’s FSA, 
CEOs of SROs, and more. But Dan will be the first to “speak,” I’m 
putting that in air quotes, twice at the Sommer Lecture. Back in 2007, 
then SEC Commission Paul Atkins delivered the Eighth Annual 
Sommer Lecture.1 As Commissioner Atkins’ counsel at the time, I’m 
pretty confident that Dan played a key role in crafting the remarks 
delivered that night. He may not have been on stage as the lecturer, but 
Dan surely had a hand in what was said. Since that time, Dan has been a 
big supporter of Fordham and this series as was evident to me when he 
enthusiastically accepted our invitation to speak this year. 
Morgan Lewis is proud of Al Sommers’ lifelong work and his 
affiliation with our firm, and we’re pleased to sponsor this annual 
lecture in his honor. I am delighted to again turn the podium over to our 
speaker tonight, SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher. 
																																																																																																																																
 1. Paul S. Atkins, The Eighth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, 
Securities, and Financial Law, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 177 (2008). 
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LECTURE: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION – THE NEXT 
80 YEARS 
DANIEL GALLAGHER: Thank you, Ben [Indek], for that kind 
introduction. I am truly honored to be here tonight to deliver the 
15th Annual A.A. Sommer Lecture. It is a particular honor to deliver this 
lecture in the presence of Al’s family. In addition to serving as an SEC 
Commissioner during a particularly trying time, Al Sommer played an 
impressively wide range of roles over the course of his career. To name 
just a few, he was Chairman of the Public Oversight Board of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the SEC Advisory 
Committee on Corporate Disclosure, and the America Bar Association 
Section of Business Law, and he was the Vice Chairman of the NASD. 
The one theme that resonated throughout Al’s storied career — 
well, other than being a glutton for punishment — was an unparalleled 
dedication to the principles that form the tripartite mandate of the SEC: 
the maintenance of fair, orderly, and efficient markets, the facilitation of 
capital formation, and investor protection. This dedication was always 
evident in his indelible and tremendously positive contributions to the 
field of securities regulation and explains why, four decades after his 
service on the Commission and a dozen years after his passing, we 
gather every year to honor his legacy. 
Al was not partisan, nor was he a mere bureaucrat. He was a 
principled, passionate, and tremendously sophisticated advocate for both 
investors and the growth-promoting, job-creating capital markets, and he 
did not see any contradiction in that. He knew that strong, fair, and 
transparent markets that aid capital formation benefit both the individual 
investor and our economy as a whole. He was, in short, the paradigm of 
a dedicated public servant, and though I never had the good fortune to 
meet him, he represents to me everything a Commissioner should strive 
— and that I do strive — to be. 
As many of you are aware, 2014 marks the SEC’s 80th anniversary. 
Tonight, I’d like to discuss a topic that I believe would have been of 
critical interest to Al Sommer: the future — the next 80 years — at the 
SEC. Over the next eight decades, the SEC’s fate will be intertwined, as 
it always has been, with that of our capital markets. Despite robust 
market activity over the last few years, the U.S. capital markets, the 
manner in which they are regulated, and the SEC itself collectively face 
an existential threat: the encroaching imposition of so-called prudential 
regulation on markets wholly unsuited to that regulatory paradigm. To 
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put it simply, the manner in which the Commission responds to this 
encroachment, as well as to the unprecedented, decade-long burden 
placed upon us by a hundred Dodd-Frank Act mandates,2 will determine 
whether the SEC remains as relevant in the 21st century as it was in the 
20th — and more importantly, whether our capital markets, still the best 
in the world despite an onslaught of self-inflicted frictions, can continue 
to be the drivers of economic growth and prosperity that they have been 
for so long. 
Before discussing the way forward, it’s important to understand 
what the SEC is today and how it evolved to this point over the past 80 
years. The “What We Do” section of our website states, “First and 
foremost, the SEC is a law enforcement agency.”3 I respectfully, but 
firmly, disagree with that statement as a point of fact. For much of the 
twentieth century, with limited exceptions,4 the Commission lacked civil 
penalty authority against either individuals or corporations. Instead, the 
agency was limited to seeking injunctions and other equitable remedies, 
such as stop orders, disgorgement, and officer-and-director bars.5 The 
SEC’s Division of Enforcement was not created until 1972,6 and it was 
not until 1984 that Congress gave the Commission authority to seek 
civil penalties in insider trading cases,7 which it supplemented in 1988.8 
In 1990, Congress passed the Remedies Act, 9  which gave the 
																																																																																																																																
 2. This figure includes both rulemakings and formal studies mandated by 
Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 3. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, WHAT WE DO, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2015); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, HOW 
INVESTIGATIONS WORK, http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/ 
1356125787012 (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
 4. For example, violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and limited 
penalty authority for issuers who failed to file certain required reports. 
 5. See S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 7 & n.8 (1990) (noting that the SEC did have 
penalty authority against companies for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
and limited penalty authority for issuers who failed to file certain required reports). 
 6. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, THIRTY EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION xxvii (1972), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1970/197
2_0630_SECAR.pdf. 
 7. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 
(1984). 
 8. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988). 
 9. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990). 
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Commission, among other things, robust penalty authority against 
individuals and nuanced penalty authority, meant to be used judiciously 
— and certainly not in a manner that would further harm already injured 
shareholders — against corporate issuers.10 
Now, none of this is meant in any way to diminish the importance 
of the SEC’s enforcement role or the excellence of our Enforcement 
staff. It is, however, important to put the SEC’s enforcement role in 
perspective. To this day, apparently unbeknownst to some elected 
officials, we have no criminal authority — criminal sanctions remain 
within the purview of the Department of Justice. And, I’m sorry to 
disappoint fans of The Simpsons and Arrested Development, but the 
SEC has neither SWAT teams nor patrol boats.11 
As I stated in a speech earlier this year, the SEC is, first and 
foremost, a disclosure agency.12 Indeed, one of the most important of the 
countless services performed by Al Sommer was his chairmanship of the 
Commission’s Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure. In 
November 1977, the Committee issued its report, which stated, among 
other things, “Reliable and timely information sufficient to the needs of 
those who have the responsibility for the allocation of investment . . . 
resources is essential to the efficient allocation of resources in any 
economy.” The report stressed the need for a “mandate to assure that 
sufficient, timely and reliable information is available to investment 
decision-makers” and concluded that the SEC was “the appropriate 
agency to provide such assurance.”13 
To return, then, to my theme this evening, the Committee’s report, 
which is still worth reading almost four decades later, is consistent with 
what I believe are two key guideposts that will ensure the Commission’s 
continued relevance and success over the next eight decades. First, the 
																																																																																																																																
 10. Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, “Remarks at Columbia Law School 
Conference (Hot Topics: Leading Current Issues in Securities Regulation and 
Enforcement)” (Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/ 
Detail/Speech/1370540386071. 
 11. See ”The Ziff Who Came to Dinner” (The Simpsons, Season 15, Episode 14); 
“Pilot” (Arrested Development, Season 1, Episode 1); “Development Arrested” 
(Arrested Development, Season 3, Episode 13). 
 12. Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the 
Forum for Corporate Directors, Orange County, California (Jan. 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540680363#.VDLJhBC8-6I. 
 13. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 
REP. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE II (Comm. Print 1977). 
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need to maintain our focus on the basic, blocking-and-tackling, 
everyday regulation for which the Commission was established, and 
second, the need to carry out our tripartite mandate in the face of 
innumerable distractions and, especially, the encroachment of prudential 
regulators and the prudential model of regulation on the capital markets. 
We must not let the prudential regulators’ shiny new issues du 
jour distract us from our core mission. 
The first guidepost requires little explanation. To be blunt, many, if 
not most, of the 100 mandates imposed upon the Commission by the 
Dodd-Frank Act do not by any measure represent the best use of the 
Commission’s time and resources. Most obviously, whether one views 
the SEC as a disclosure agency or an enforcement agency, sociopolitical 
issues such as conflict minerals and extractive resources, while perhaps 
worthy of attention by the right entities, should not be part of the SEC’s 
agenda. Rulemakings for such issues contribute neither to the 
maintenance of fair, orderly, and efficient markets, nor the facilitation of 
capital formation, nor investor protection. They are the creations of 
special interest groups every bit as strong as K Street lobbyists, and they 
severely sap the finite bandwidth of the SEC. As Chair White rightfully 
noted in this very same venue last year, “[T]he independence of the 
agency . . . should be respected by those outside, including the industry, 
other agencies, Congress and the courts. That independence — and the 
agency’s unique expertise — should be, for example, respected by those 
who seek to effectuate social policy or political change through the 
SEC’s powers of mandatory disclosure.”14 
Even the more relevant Dodd-Frank mandates have forced the 
Commission to radically restructure its priorities. For example, a 
mandate to regulate securities-based swaps is certainly germane to the 
work of the Commission, but these products represent a mere 5% of the 
swaps market, with the other 95% falling under the jurisdiction of the 
CFTC. To be blunt once again, our swaps rulemaking has taken up a 
wildly disproportionate amount of the Commission’s attention. If we are 
to survive for the next 80 years as the independent, expert agency that 
has produced the imperfect but unparalleled successes of the past eight 
decades in overseeing capital markets and protecting investors, we 
simply must regain control of our agenda. As I’ve said many times over 
																																																																																																																																
 14. Mary Jo White, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Lecture: The Importance of 
Independence, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4 (2014). 
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the past three years, even if we did nothing other than Dodd-Frank work 
from this point forward, it would still take over half a decade or more to 
address all of those mandates — by which point the agency would be 
unrecognizable and potentially irrelevant. We must approach the 
gargantuan task of fulfilling our 60 or so remaining Congressional 
mandates with a clear and logical vision of what is important for 
investors, markets, and the country.15 Sadly, no such paradigm has been 
applied in the over four years since the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, 
and the trend will continue as we consider uber-political items like 
credit risk retention and pay ratio in the coming weeks and months. 
This brings us to the second guidepost. For years now — especially 
since the enactment of Dodd-Frank — the Commission has consistently 
faced encroachments on its regulatory purview from prudential 
regulators and, even more concerning, pressure to join the prudential 
regulators in adopting the defense against “systemic risk” as part of our 
mission. For the past three years I have cautioned against the SEC 
rushing to join that Basel cocktail party. 
It’s easy, and, to be honest, somewhat natural to see this as a turf 
war. It certainly makes for a more interesting narrative than the truth, 
which, frankly, is that the last thing the SEC needs is more “turf.” As 
someone who’s been clamoring for a return to basic blocking and 
tackling ever since my confirmation as a Commissioner three years ago, 
I’m acutely sensitive to the limits of the Commission’s resources and the 
very real risks of overextension. Indeed, I believe that the Commission 
should find more ways to work with the Fed. We have many shared 
interests and, especially on the international front, could accomplish 
much if we stood together. It’s my sincere hope that the SEC and the 
Fed work together to attain our shared goals — but that relationship 
must be a true partnership. 
I have been defending the importance of the markets and market 
participants subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction, as well as the 
disclosure-based regulatory paradigm through which we exercise our 
authority, since the beginning of my term as a Commissioner. The move 
to impose prudential regulation on our capital markets, in particular by 
applying a one-size-fits-all approach to capital requirements, is nothing 
short of an existential threat to those markets. If the SEC is to remain 
independent and relevant for the next eighty years, we need to challenge 
the prudential regulators’ encroachments on capital markets regulation. 
																																																																																																																																
 15. This figure includes both Dodd-Frank Act and JOBS Act rulemakings. 
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For example, as I explained in detail in a speech earlier this 
year, 16  it’s crucial to understand why differing types of financial 
institutions need different minimum capital levels. In the banking sector, 
capital requirements are rightly designed with the paramount goal of 
enhancing safety and soundness, both for individual banks and for the 
banking system as a whole. They serve to mitigate risk and protect 
against failure, and they reduce the potential that taxpayers will be 
required to backstop a failed bank in a time of stress. 
In the capital markets, however, we want investors and institutions 
to take risks — informed risks that they freely choose in pursuit of a 
return on their investments. It is impossible to eliminate investment risk 
without eliminating the corresponding opportunity for a return as well. It 
would certainly be nice if the principal we invested in our capital 
markets was guaranteed to be as safe as the money we deposit in our 
passbook savings accounts (if such things still exist) but for the fact that 
the tradeoff would be savings account-level returns on our investments. 
If, like most Americans, you have been disappointed in our post-
recession “recovery,” just wait until we have safe and sound, 
prudentially-regulated capital markets promising us a guaranteed one 
half of one percent return. 
The risks posed to our capital markets by microprudential 
regulation are dire in and of themselves, but they are amplified 
exponentially when we factor in the risks posed by macroprudential 
regulation as well. The Dodd-Frank Act ushered in an era of regulation 
based on addressing systemic risk led by the unaccountable, opaque, and 
prudential regulator-dominated Financial Stability Oversight Council. 
I have also been warning of the dangers to our markets posed by 
FSOC since the beginning of my term as Commissioner.17 
																																																																																																																																
 16. Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Philosophies 
of Capital Requirements (Jan. 15, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/ 
Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540629644. 
 17. As I explained in early 2012: 
The core of bank regulation is safety and soundness… The SEC, on 
the other hand, regulates markets that are inherently risky. Indeed, 
the risks taken by investors are absolutely critical to capital 
allocation, which in turn is critical to economic growth. The SEC 
works to protect investors willing to accept the risk of securities 
markets in the hopes of greater returns by ensuring that those 
markets are fair and efficient, not risk-free, and does so with the 
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Since that time, the imposition of a bank-oriented model of 
regulation on the SEC and the markets it regulates has crossed from the 
realm of the theoretical into reality. The wildly unrealistic deadlines set 
in Dodd-Frank’s mandates to the Commission certainly don’t help on 
this front: with almost 60 more mandates to complete, we leave 
ourselves open to criticism — which, despite being misplaced, is now 
rampant — that we are failing to do our part to address systemic risk. 
While we toil away on rules designed with the sole purpose of providing 
for the naming and shaming of the public companies that are the engines 
of our economy, the prudential regulators promulgate with no cost-
benefit analysis rules that affect our markets and market participants — 
all in the name of battling systemic risk. 
Clearly, the fact that systemic risk reduction is not part of the 
SEC’s mandate has not prevented such criticism. It’s important to 
understand, however, that fulfilling our mandate to maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, facilitate capital formation, and protect 
investors is by far the best manner by which the SEC can contribute to 
the reduction of systemic risk. With the capital markets being such an 
integral part of our economy, ensuring their success will have far more 
of a positive effect on the integrity and soundness of our financial 
system than would any action we could take as a result of abandoning 
our mission in favor of regulating based on reducing systemic risk. 
They say that if the only tool you have is a hammer, everything 
looks like a nail. Well, for our friends at the prudential regulatory 
agencies, for the past few years, it’s been Hammer Time, and when it 
comes to any of the SEC’s regulated entities with any affiliation 
whatsoever with a bank, their message to us has increasingly been, “U 
Can’t Touch This.”18 
The prudential regulators, however, have many other tools, not the 
least of which has been their ability to employ loaded language to their 
																																																																																																																																
benefit of nearly eight decades of experience in regulating those 
markets. Were FSOC to interpret its bank-oriented mandate as a 
license to impose a bank-oriented model of regulation on the SEC 
and the markets it regulates, the results could have a devastating 
effect on markets. 
Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Ongoing Regulatory 
Reform in the Global Capital Markets (March 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171490004. 
 18. MC HAMMER, U CAN’T TOUCH THIS (Capitol Records 1990). 
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industry? Shadow banking! That $100 you lent to your brother-in-law? 
Better have good documentation of that shadow banking transaction 
when the prudential regulators come calling. Shadow banking is the 
perfect straw man, reducing any non-bank, and therefore non-
prudentially regulated, financial transaction to boogeyman status. Who 
knows what evil lurks in the heart of the shadow banking system? The 
Fed knows.19 
And what the Fed knows, it seems, the FSB knows as well. By 
FSB, I’m referring to the Financial Stability Board, not the Russian 
security agency — the successor to the KGB — that shares the FSB 
acronym, although they probably know it too. The FSB is an 
unaccountable, seemingly ideological, and totally opaque organization 
that should frighten us all. To resolve any potential confusion, I should 
point out that I’m still talking about the Financial Stability Board. 
The FSB essentially serves as the implementing agency for the G-
20, which formed the FSB in 2009 as a much stronger alternative to the 
existing Financial Stability Forum. As the organization states on its 
website, “The FSB has been established to coordinate at the 
international level the work of national financial authorities and 
international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote the 
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial 
sector policies in the interest of financial stability.”20 
Personally, I have grave concerns about both the mandate and 
jurisdiction of the FSB. As I’ve noted, although “financial stability” is 
the outcome to be expected if we do our job right, it’s not part of our 
mandate. In addition, as an independent agency, the Commission is 
expressly not a part of the Presidential administration, and I find it 
extremely troubling to effectively be ordered about by an extension of 
the G-20. Not only does the SEC not answer to the G-20, by design, we 
don’t answer to the president. 
Despite my misgivings, however, I believe that the SEC should 
take advantage of its seat at the FSB — hopefully in conjunction with 
other U.S. regulators — to advocate for strong capital markets. 
Getting back to my point about loaded language, the term 
“systemic risk” is also tremendously useful to prudential regulators. 
After all, who could be opposed to taking measures to address potential 
																																																																																																																																
 19. See The Shadow (CBS radio broadcast 1937-1954). 
 20. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
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systemic risk? Conveniently, the benefits of reducing or eliminating 
systemic risk are presented as potentially infinite. So great a benefit 
leads to the defenestration of economic analysis — when the benefit is 
claimed to be potentially saving our entire economy from collapse, no 
burden is too heavy, so a serious discussion of benefits and costs is 
thrown out the window. 
So, to sum up, the SEC faces a crushing burden of Congressional 
mandates that will interfere with our blocking-and-tackling work for 
years to come if we let them, and we face a frontal attack on our 
jurisdiction as well as our very paradigm of regulation by newly formed 
entities that are dominated by prudential regulators, focused on 
mandates — some supranational — fundamentally different than ours. 
To quote Marine legend “Chesty” Puller’s response when he was 
told that his Marines were surrounded and their supply lines cut, 
“They’ve got us right where we want ‘em. We can shoot in every 
direction now.”21 As Al Sommer could testify, the SEC, born in the 
Great Depression following the worst stock market crash in history and 
tempered by crises throughout its history, has been in tough spots 
before. Like Al, I believe in our mission and I believe in our people. 
What’s more, I firmly believe that despite the SEC’s tremendous 
successes and hugely positive impact on our capital markets and our 
economy as a whole over the past eight decades, our best days are yet to 
come, provided we take action now to reassert our mission and the 
importance of our independence in carrying out that mission. It is time 
for the Commission to rise to these challenges instead of chasing each 
exciting new issue du jour. 
So what, in practice, does this mean? First, we need to affirmatively 
engage Congress and the Administration and work with them to remove 
the useless or counterproductive elements of the Dodd-Frank Act. The 
emphasis is on affirmatively engaging — we cannot remain passive 
observers, speaking only when spoken to by policymakers, and expect to 
succeed in reforming Dodd-Frank. Second, we need to become a savvier 
agency — specifically, an agency that serves as an efficient overseer of 
the capital markets and an aggregator and analyzer of critical market 
information through the better use of technology. Finally, we need to 
affirmatively engage other regulators and relevant policymakers in the 
critical policy debates of the day — and for that matter, of the past five 
																																																																																																																																
 21. Gen. Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, MARINE CORPS LEGACY MUSEUM, available at 
http://www.marinecorpsmuseum.org/tohonor/lpuller.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2012). 
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years. I have been doing so since the beginning of my term and have 
found that most stakeholders are receptive to our participation in such 
debates. We can learn from their perspective, and they from ours. 
Thank you for your attention as well as for allowing me to take part 
in this wonderful annual tradition. 
 
